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For hyt ys old Englysch sawe: A mayde schuld be seen, but not herd.
—John Mirk, Festial (1380s)1
A very small, very small shirker named Jo-Jo
Was standing, just standing, and bouncing a Yo-Yo!
Not making a sound! Not a yip! Not a chirp!
And the Mayor rushed inside and he grabbed the young twerp!
—Dr. Seuss, Horton Hears a Who! (1954)2
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the
age and maturity of the child.
—Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)3
I too am not a bit tamed . . . I too am untranslatable;
I sound my barbaric yawp over the roofs of the world.
—Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself ” (1855)4
I.	Introduction

A Messenger traveling between worlds brings knowledge to the People. They
resist, he suffers, a Child mediates, and Wisdom is gained. This mythic essence is
retained where the messenger is an amiable elephant, the people consist of a gang of
monkeys, two kangaroos, and an eagle, and the child is a young twerp, as in Dr.
Seuss’s Horton Hears a Who!. Horton tells the story of an elephant residing in the Jungle
of Nool who one day hears “a very faint yelp / As if some tiny person were calling for
help.” The sound comes from “a small speck of dust floating past through the air.”
Convinced that the speck is a minute world inhabited by real persons, the Whos,
1.

John Mirk, Festial 229–230 (Theodore Erbe ed., 1905). The maxim that children should be seen and
not heard was old by the late fourteenth century when Caxton first published the collected sermons of
John Mirk, Canon of Lilleshall Abbey, Shropshire. Meant to entertain while teaching orthodox
Christianity, the Festial was the most popular and influential collection of English sermons throughout
the late medieval and early Tudor periods. A Critical Edition of John Mirk’s Festial (Susan
Powell, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010). A “child” was then an infant or a young man of gentle birth
(“childe”). Definition of Childe, The Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/
index.php?term=child (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). A “mayde” was an unmarried man or a young woman
(adolescent?). Definition of Children Should Be Seen Not Heard, The Phrase Finder, http://www.
phrases.org.uk/meanings/children-should-be-seen-and-not-heard.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).

2.

Dr. Seuss, Horton Hears a Who! (1954).

3.

Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 12, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. This article, first proposed in the Polish draft treaty
initiating the drafting process, is the first confirmation that children have expressive and participatory
rights, not just the rights to protection and welfare with which the precedent 1959 Declaration of the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov.
20, 1959) had been concerned. It signified the emergence of the child as rights-bearer.

4.

Walt Whitman, Song of Myself 54 (Paul Negri & Susan Rattiner eds., 2001). This line appeared in
the first edition of 1855 and is unchanged in subsequent publications.
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Horton promises his protection. He is violently persecuted by his fellow Nools for
“chatting with persons who’ve never existed.” Only when the Who-child Jo-Jo, “The
Smallest of All!,” joins his voice to the clamor of the Whos do the Nools hear them.
They joyfully embrace Horton’s message: “A person’s a person, no matter how small.”5
Horton is a story for children, a fantasy, a fairy tale, a myth. The potency of its
story and the power of its myth are undiluted by Seuss’s undainty slang, noodling
pictures, and irreverent rhyme. Throughout it, Tolkien’s 6 “Cauldron of Story” is
constantly replenished with “new bits, dainty and undainty.” 7 In his writing, Seuss
brings children the gift of reading.8 In Horton, he has made a true fairy tale. As
Tolkien explains, this does not mean a tale about fairies, but a sub-creation, a
secondary world with its own rules and laws which give it the “inner consistency of
reality.”9 In its resonance with old tales of messengers, origins, and the gaining of
wisdom, Horton is myth. With its not-so-sideways moral10 about how to treat others,
it is a text on human rights.11
Myth requires a messenger travelling between worlds; a trickster, a magician, or
a child, who locates for us the terrestrial world of the everyday within the realm of
myth and mediates their resolution.12 As Peter Fitzpatrick13 explains, “‘Myth’ would
once have provided at least ‘some god endowed with contradictory attributes’ who
could mediate between and encompass law’s transcendent and terrestrial existences
and render the common ground between them eloquent with sacred meaning.”14
Like ibis-headed Thoth, recorder of the Egyptian gods and pleader for human souls
5.

Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.

6.

J.R.R. Tolkien (1892–1973) was a university professor and author. See About Professor J.R.R. Tolkien,
The Tolkien Society, http://www.tolkiensociety.org/tolkien/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).

7.

J.R.R. Tolkien, On Fairy Stories, in The Tolkien Reader 52 (1966).

8.

The Book that Killed Dick and Jane: The Cat in the Hat Fifty Years On [Australian, 4/02/2007], Richard
King (Feb. 03, 2007, 8:53 PM), richardjking.blogspot.ca/2007/02/book-that-killed-dick-and-jane.html.

9.

Tolkien, supra note 7, at 15. Fairy tales are not “stories about fairies or elves, but stories about Fairy,
that is Faërie, the realm or state in which fairies have their being.” Id. at 12. His “fairy tale” is now
better known as fantasy.

10.

Henry Jenkins, No Matter How Small: The Democratic Imagination of Dr. Seuss, in Hop on Pop: The
Politics and Pleasures of Popular Culture 187, 189 (2002).

11.

A similar reading of Seuss is offered by Jonathan Todres & Sarah Higinbotham, A Percon’s a Person:
Children’s Rights in Childrens’s Literature, 45 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2013). “The books children
read and have read to them are a central part of their childhood experience; and yet, just as children
have been dismissed as rights-bearing persons, so too has children’s literature been ignored as a rightsbearing discourse and a means of civic socialization.” Id. at 5. This article marks the beginning of a
project intended “to connect and build upon the fields of children’s rights law, law and literature,
children’s literature criticism, and human rights theory to forge a new multidisciplinary subfield of
study: children’s rights and children’s literature.” Id. at 52.

12.

See generally Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law 16 (1992).

13.

Peter Fitzpatrick is Anniversary Professor of Law, School of Law, Birbeck, University of London. See
Professor Peter Fitzpatrick, Birbeck Sch. of L., http://www.bbk.ac.uk/law/our-staff/ft-academic/
fitzpatrick/fitzpatrickblog (last updated Oct. 1, 2013).

14.

Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 9 (quoting Claude Lévi-Strauss).
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at the judgment of the dead, his Greek counterpart Hermes, winged-foot messenger
of the gods,15 Iris the rainbow who communicates between earth and sky,16 and
Raven, whose trickery brings life, light, and a new way of living to the peoples of the
Pacific Northwest,17 the divine mage Hermes Trismegistus travels to heaven and
back with the message “The below is as the above, and the above as the below.”18
Horton’s message is its echo: “A person’s a person, no matter how small.” Although
Horton struggles mightily to save the Whos, it is the Who-child Jo-Jo’s YOPP! that
“put it over!” “Finally, at last! From that speck on that clover / Their voices were
heard!”19
“A person’s a person” is the foundation of Horton’s undertaking to the minuscule
Whos, the message he carries from their world to his own, and the moral of the tale.
A metaphysician faced with the materialism of the jungle, Horton has found, or
intuited, or heard the premise of the world’s human rights instruments, the basis of
its declarations, constitutions, covenants, conventions, treaties, and bills of rights: a
person’s a person, and personhood entails rights.20 That the voice of the mythic Child
saves Who-ville from annihilation and Nool from its isolationism (and the
commission of genocide) shows that the message refers in a literal way to the smallest
of all persons—children.
Childhood is a realm of myth. Its geography—the places and spaces of love and
fear, hunger and desire, transgression and reconciliation, journeys out and ways
home—is neither outgrown nor fully known.21 In mapping childhood’s landscapes of
tangled forests, calm or turbulent seas, and labyrinths of streets, attics, rivers, and
caves, stories for children fold other worlds into the everyday. They tell the meaning
of being human and, innate in that telling, the nature of the law that sustains our
communal species. The stories reflect much older myths of origin that tell of the
creation of the world, messengers, and gifts of laws governing its dwellers. Childhood
15.

See generally Stephan A. Hoeller, On the Trail of the Winged God: Hermes and Hermeticism Throughout the
Ages, Gnosis: A Journal of Western Inner Traditions, Summer 1996, available at http://gnosis.
org/hermes.htm.

16.

“Iris” is a collocation of the Greek “iris” (rainbow) and “eiris” (messenger). Iris, Theoi Greek
Mythology, http://www.theoi.com/Pontios/Iris.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).

17.

See generally Ann Chowning, Raven Myths in Northwestern North America and Northeastern Asia, 1
Arctic Anthropology 1 (1962); Dawn E. Bastian & Judy K. Mitchell, Handbook of Native
American Mythology 40, 156 (2004).

18.

Alexander Roob, Alchemy and Mysticism: The Hermetic Museum 8 (2001).

19.

Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.

20. U.S. Const.; U.N. Charter; European Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950,

213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).

21.

Anne McGillivray, A State of Imperfect Transformation: Law, Myth and the Feminine in Outside Over
There, Labyrinth and Pan’s Labyrinth, in Law and Childhood Studies: 14 Current Legal Issues
10 (Michael Freeman ed., 2012) [hereinafter McGillivray, State of Imperfect Transformation]; Governing
Childhood 1–24 (Anne McGillivray ed., 1997); Anne McGillivray, The Long Awaited: Past Futures of
Children’s Rights, 12 Int’l J. of Child. Rts. 209, 232 (2013) [hereinafter McGillivray, The Long
Awaited].
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matters. Being a human child is not just about becoming independent, sexually
mature adults, as it is for other species. Childhood is, in itself, of central importance.
Of twenty-seven known hominids, only we survived.22 There is no other human
species. We survived because only we evolved an extended childhood.23 “Human
children are the most voracious learners Earth has ever seen, and they are that way
because their brains are still rapidly developing after birth.” 24 “Neoteny, and the
childhood it spawned, not only extended the time during which we grow up but
ensured that we spent it developing not inside the safety of the womb but outside in the
wide, convoluted, and unpredictable world.”25 Our long childhood lets us develop
ourselves through our experiences and environment in ways unavailable to other
species, leaving us “the last apes standing.”26 Whether we continue to survive as we are,
or hope to be, depends “on the child in us, the part that loves to meander and play, go
down blind alleys, wonder why and fancy the impossible.”27 Stories for children, as
myth, as law, guide that meandering, show ways out of blind alleys, and enhance the
fantasies necessary to unfold childhood into an enlightened legal subjectivity.
Part II of this paper considers relationships between myth and fantasy and myth
and law, the fusion of literature and law in stories for children, and Seuss’s gift of
“selling without shouting” in his promotion of a transgressive, inventive, incipient
subject of law. Part III deploys the lens of (critical) legal pluralism to investigate the
normative orders found in Horton and to shed light on the problem Seuss has set:
how to reconcile the opposing world visions of Horton, defender of the Whos, and
the sour kangaroo, prosecutrix for the Nools. Part IV addresses the roles of Jo-Jo the
Who-child as rights-bearer, kangaroo courts, and the centrality of the child’s right
to be heard. Part V investigates the rights of children as set out in the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the non-severability of children’s bodies and
children’s rights, and the role of parents and the state in protecting and guiding the
child’s exercise of rights. Part VI offers some concluding thoughts on rights, the
Whos and the Who-child Jo-Jo as metaphors of childhood, and the power of myth
in the making of the subject of law.

22.

Chip Walter, Why Are We the Last Apes Standing? How Childhood Let Modern Humans Conquer the Planet,
Slate (Jan. 29, 2013), http://goo.gl/JBXyoX [hereinafter Walter, Why Are We the Last Apes Standing?];
see also Chip Walter, Last Ape Standing: The Seven-Million-Year Story of How and Why
We Survived (2013).

23.

Walter, Why Are We the Last Apes Standing?, supra note 22.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26. Id.
27.

Id.
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II.	“All I heard . . . was the breeze”28—fantasy, myth, and law in stories
for children

Stories—as myth, as fantasy, as fairy tale—guide us through our long childhood.
For Bruno Bettelheim, 29
Myths and fairy stories both answer the eternal questions: What is the world
really like? How can I truly be myself? The answers given by myths are
definite, while the fairy tale is suggestive; its messages may imply solutions,
but it never spells them out. 30

Fairy tales offer the child “the chance to understand himself in this complex world.”31
The child “must be helped to make some coherent sense out of the turmoil of his
feelings” through “a moral education which subtly, and by implication only, conveys to
him the advantages of moral behavior, not through abstract ethical concepts but for that
which seems tangibly right and therefore meaningful to him.”32 While Seuss would
agree that the moral must be subtly implied,33 Bettelheim’s Freudian approach to the
German folk fairy tales collected by the Brothers Grimm34 is anything but subtle.
Grimm’s tales, Bettelheim argues, perform a psychoanalytical function: “Freud’s
prescription is that only by struggling courageously against what can seem like
overwhelming odds can man succeed in wringing meaning out of his existence.”35 Fairy
tales guide the child through the developmental stages and crises identified by Freud.
To the child it seems that his life is a sequence of periods of smooth living
which are suddenly and incomprehensibly interrupted as he is projected into
immense danger . . . in an instant everything changes, and the friendly world
turns into a nightmare of dangers. This happens when a loving parent suddenly
makes what seem like utterly unreasonable demands and terrifying threats.36

Ann Swinfen37 shows that modern fantasy is “frequently imbued with a profound
moral purpose and, even when set in a different historical period or, more interestingly,
in a complete otherworld, display[s] a concern for contemporary problems and offer[s]
28. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
29. Bruno Bettelheim (1903–90) was a child psychologist and writer. See Bruno Bettelheim, Jewish Virtual

Libr., http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Bettelheim.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2014).

30. Bruno Bettelheim, The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales

45 (1977).

31.

Id. at 5.

32.

Id.

33.

Jenkins, supra note 10.

34. The tales under Bettelheim’s psychoanalysis include Hansel and Gretel, Little Red Riding Hood, Jack and

the Beanstalk, and The Jealous Queen in Snow White and the Myth of Oedipus.

35.

Bettelheim, supra note 30, at 8.

36. Id. at 145.
37.

Ann Swinfen is an academic and novelist. See About Ann Swinfen, annswinfen.com, http://www.
annswinfen.com/about/ (last updated 2010).
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a critique of contemporary society.”38 A fantasy may be set in this world (as in Aesop’s
“Talking Beast” tales), 39 in the everyday world in juxtaposition with a secondary or
otherworld (as in C.S. Lewis’s The Chronicles of Narnia),40 or solely in a secondary
world (as in J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings cycle).41 Secondary-world or “pure”
fantasies may be founded on “deeply felt moral and religious convictions, and
frequently result in the presentation of metaphysical concepts as physical realities.”42
The experience of reading works of fantasy is one of transgression, of treading on
difficult ground in unfamiliar places where perhaps one ought not to be, and of trials,
reconciliations, and return. In his definitive essay on the fairy tale, Tolkien writes,
Faërie contains many things besides elves and fays, and besides dwarfs, witches,
trolls, giants or dragons: it holds the seas, the sun, the moon, the sky; and the
earth and all the things that are in it. . . . Most good “fairy-stories” are about
the aventures of men in the Perilous Realm or upon its shadowy marches.43

This is the realm of myth. In her analysis of works of fantasy for children, Sheila
Egoff44 characterizes the roots of the genre as
deeper than those of any other literary genre, for they lie in the oldest
literature of all—myth, legend, and folklore. Myths can now be seen as a dim
vision of a reality that our ancestors saw very clearly—the true and fixed
nature of things that made for a more orderly world.45

For Egoff, the “familiar goals” of fantasy include

the affirmation of moral and emotional truths, the opening of the inner eye
of the imagination to look beyond reality, the understanding that things are
not always as they seem, and the creation of imaginary worlds and their
inhabitants who . . . can have faith in the midst of disaster. Such fantasies
keep us close to our ancestors—to a time when there was a spirit in every
river, a demon in every cave, a life force in every tree.46

38. Ann Swinfen, In Defence of Fantasy: A Study of the Genre in English and American

Literature Since 1945, at 2 (1984). Tolkien’s analysis of fantasy, supra note 7, is pivotal in her discussion.

39.

Swinfen, supra note 38, at 2, 10.

40. Id.
41.

Id.

42.

Id. at 10.

43.

Tolkien, supra note 7, at 9.

44. Sheila Egoff (1918–2005) was a librarian, educator, and author who was regarded as an authority on

children’s literature. See Biography of Sheila Egoff, Cambridge Ont., http://www.cambridge.ca/cs_
pubaccess/hall_of_fame.php?aid=14 (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).

45.

Sheila A. Egoff, Worlds Within: Children’s Fantasy from the Middle Ages to Today 3–5
(1988). (“Many modern fantasists have made use of the ‘matter’ of myth . . . [and] the structural patterns
of the imagination found in the oral tradition.”).

46. Id. at 310 (“[I]n the present, it appears as if children will have to go to the literature of the past to

partake of the enchantment of the world.”).
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Bettelheim, Swinfen, and Egoff defend fantasy, in part, on the basis of a moral
purpose, moral conviction, or moral truth. None, however, defines “moral.” Given
the matter of which they write, it is clear that “moral” means something far beyond
the simple dichotomies of right and wrong, good and evil, obedience and
transgression. It is why the expression or exposition of that meaning requires a story
and not a command, maxim, fable, or parable. Philip Nel47 more cautiously observes
that “Seuss offers preparation for the often dangerous world beyond his books, where
flawed individuals need to remain mindful of the rights of others and strive to make
choices that cause the least harm and the most good.”48
If myth guides the child through the long childhood that is crucial to our unique
species, then myth is law in its deep and difficult sense, and stories for children are the
legal texts of childhood. Bettelheim finds it unproblematic that the child’s world
becomes a nightmare “when a loving parent suddenly makes what seem like utterly
unreasonable demands and terrifying threats.”49 We now see this as unreasonable,
perilous, and, at its extreme, unlawful. It is the realm of myth that is meant to be
perilous, not the child’s world of the everyday. Childhood is never free of its peculiar
terrors, but to deny rights to children is to limit their childhood by depriving them of
respect, dignity, autonomy, and protection from violence, thus multiplying those
terrors. Without rights, childhood may be a nightmare foreclosing what the child may
become as an adult. If stories for children are legal texts, they are texts on human
rights. When the stepmother and her daughters abuse and exploit Cinderella, the child
is stung at the injustice.50 When her personhood is recognized, we live happily ever
after. When the Who-child Jo-Jo at last sounds his barbaric YOPP!, we know that he
is heard and all will be well. If the concept of children’s rights was foreign to most in
Seuss’s day, it was by no means unknown.51 In Horton, Seuss draws upon the deep
47.

Philip Nel is a Professor of English at Kansas State University and a scholar of children’s literature. See
Biography of Philip Nel, Kan. St. U., http://www.k-state.edu/media/mediaguide/bios/nelbio.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2014).

48. Philip Nel, “Said a Bird in the Midst of a Blitz…”: How World War II Created Dr. Seuss, 34.2 Mosaic 65,

66 (2001).

49. Bettelheim, supra note 30, at 145.
50. See generally Charles Perrault, Cinderella or the Little Glass Slipper, in The Blue Fairy Book 64 (Andrew

Lang ed., 5th ed. 1891). After reading Cinderella, the children in Hampshire, England’s rightsrespecting schools comment on Cinderella’s rights:
10-year-old Daniel answers “The stepmother and her sisters were horrible to Cinderella.
They kept her in a cellar and made her work like a slave, which infringed Article 19—the
right to be protected from being hurt or badly treated.” Grace, aged 11 years, adds “Her
stepmother was very cruel and denied her right to be protected from abuse and it infringed
Article 31 when they didn’t let her go to the ball, because children have a right to play.”
Children may also be encouraged to write a letter to the police in the role of someone worried
about the way in which Cinderella was being neglected and abused by her step-family.

Katherine Covell, R. Brian Howe & Justin K. McNeil, Implementing Children’s Human Rights
Education in Schools, in 13 Improving Schools 117, 119 (2010).
51.

For an excellent overview of the history, development, theory, and critique of rights for children, see 1
Children’s Rights (Michael D. A. Freeman ed., 2004) (introduction and the essays collected therein).
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power of myth to portray the child as rights-bearer. The inaudible and invisible Whos
are a metaphor for the child who is to be seen and not heard. Jo-Jo, the emblematic
Child, carries the message home.
In his study of Maurice Sendak’s Where the Wild Things Are, Desmond Manderson52
asserts that “the mythological elements of children’s stories ought themselves to be
regarded as an essential site for the emergence of particular understandings of law.”53
Stories for children are not “a series of texts about the law” but “the fusion of law and
literature” and “the key to the constitutive myths and narratives that begin to organize
our relationships to law.”54 Myth, Peter Fitzpatrick writes, “sets the limits of the world,
of what can be meant and done, and transcends these limits in its relation to the sacred,”
the place of “ultimate origins and ultimate identity . . . the source and foundational
force of all that is.”55 Myth makes sense of where we come from, who we are, and how
we conduct ourselves in our relations with one another and with the natural world.
In telling of origins, transgressions, and reconciliation, myth is law and the origin
of the idea of law. Law is derived from myth and myth sustains it. “In nearly all
societies, the laws are accompanied by myths explaining that they are of divine origin.”56
The Babylonian creation epic Enuma Elish tells of the slaying of the chaos dragon
Tiamat by the god-hero Marduk who cleaves her body to make earth and heaven, and
fashions humanity from her bones.57 The tale turns to the founding of Babylon, the
building of the ziggurat, and the establishment of the law. “It goes directly from the
creation myth to the myth of the origin of law because law is naturally conservative,
and a myth about its origin would naturally be concerned with the establishing of order
out of an original chaos.”58 The mythic origins of Western law have a dual origin in
classical Greek mythology and in the Bible. Themis personified divine law in Greek
myth,59 but the origin of law as a matter of courts, mediation, and social order lies in
the Greek myth of Orestes. Having murdered his mother in retribution for her murder
52.

Desmond Manderson is a Future Fellow and Professor of Law at Australian National University. See
Biography of Desmond Manderson, Austl. Nat’l U., https://researchers.anu.edu.au/researchers/
manderson-dra#biography (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).

53.

Desmond Manderson, From Hunger to Love: Myths of the Source, Interpretation, and Constitution of Law
in Children’s Literature, 15 Law & Literature 87, 91 (2003).

54. Id. at 93, 97–98.
55.

Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 16.

56. Northrop Frye & Jay Macpherson, Biblical and Classical Myths: The Mythological

Framework of Western Culture 162 (2004). Additionally, see id. chapters 15 (“Law: Ordering a
Society”) and 16 (“Law and Revolution”).

57.

Leonard William King, The Seven Tablets of Creation (1902) (including the full translation of
the Enuma Elish).

58. Frye & Macpherson, supra note 56, at 162.
59.

“In the Homeric poems, Themis [meaning ‘that which is put in place,’ divine law] is the personification
of the order of things established by law, custom, and equity, whence she is described as reigning in the
assemblies of men (Od. ii. 68, &c.), and as convening, by the command of Zeus, the assembly of the
gods (Il. xx. 4).” Themis, Theoi Greek Mythology, http://www.theoi.com/Titan/TitanisThemis.
html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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of his father, Orestes began a feud that must be mediated in order to end the cycle of
revenge.60 The Oresteia tells of the mythic origin of the Athenian law court, the
Areopagus, which is the origin of the Western judicial system. The Bible, conversely,
depicts the origin of law not in mediation but in the rebellion of the Israelites against
their Egyptian masters.61 Only upon their escape into the desert do they become a
nation and receive the law.62
The founding myth of modern law is that law supersedes myth.63 This myth of
modernity relies on another myth for its authority, that of the myth-ridden other—the
savage, the child—that lets law confirm itself as its opposite,64 as rational, dispassionate,
and civilized. But modern law has its own covert myths of origin and validation, less
grand than classical and biblical myths, but more pernicious. In the patriarchal originmyth, law’s force is backed by the divinely willed power of the sovereign, successor to
Adam and Abraham, whose power is that of every father.65 This justified the legal
suppression of women and the feminine,66 the law of male primogeniture, the power of
corporal punishment, and the paternal ownership and control of children.67 Robert
Filmer’s68 patriarchy excluded children from even the barest protection of the law.69

60. Orestes at Delphoi, Theoi Greek Mythology, http://www.theoi.com/Gallery/T40.6.html (last visited

Mar. 12, 2014).

61.

Frye & Macpherson, supra note 56, at 162.

62. Id.
63. Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 16.
64. Id.
65.

The power of the father, the power of the patriarch granted by divine will to Adam and to Abraham, is
the locus of the power of the sovereign. See Robert Filmer, Patriarcha or The Natural Power of
Kings 12 (1680), available at http://www.constitution.org/eng/patriarcha.htm.

66. Peter Goodrich, Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, History, Law (1995).
67.

In his Second Treatise of Government (1690), John Locke refutes Filmer’s thesis quoted infra note 69.
Paternal power rests on a different basis than state power, and while children may or may not be selfowning, any claim to ownership rests with the mother because of the much greater labor she contributes to
the genesis of the child. See Anne McGillivray, Children’s Rights, Paternal Power and Fiduciary Duty: From
Roman Law to the Supreme Court of Canada, 19 Int’l J. Child. Rts. 21, 27 (2010) [hereinafter McGillivray,
Children’s Rights].

68. Sir Robert Filmer (1588–1653) was an English political theorist. See Biography of Sir Robert Filmer,

Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/207005/Sir-RobertFilmer (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).

69. “[N]ot only Adam, but the succeeding Patriarchs had, by Right of Father-hood, Royal Authority over

their children . . . for as Adam was Lord of his Children, so his Children under him, had a Command
and Power over their own Children; but still with subordination to the First Parent, who is LordParamount over his Children’s Children to all generations . . . .” Filmer, supra note 65, at 12. “And this
subjection of Children [is] the Fountain of all Regal Authority, by the Ordination of God himself.” Id.
“[F]or as Kingly Power is by the Law of God, so it hath no inferior Law to limit it. The Father of a
Family Governs by no other law than by his own Will, not by the Laws and Wills of his Sons or
Servants. There is no Nation that allows Children any Action or Remedy for being unjustly Governed.”
Id. at 78–79.
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The origins of particular laws are often said by jurists to have been lost in
antiquity, or the mists of time. Yet many lawyers have dipped into the Roman law
collected and digested by Justinian in AD 535 and rediscovered in the twelfth
century.70 Justinian observed of Roman law that “[t]he power which we have over our
children is peculiar to Roman citizens; for there are no other men possessing such a
power over children as we have.” 71 Although paternal power was comparatively
diminished under the common law, its incidents of custody, control, and corporal
punishment were retained. In Freud’s origin myth, law is forged from the guilt of the
primal horde, an ancestral band of brothers who, desiring the women hoarded by
their despotic father, devour him, and from their horror create the foundation of
patriarchal law.72 That children could be rights-bearers was foreclosed by these lawmyths. The foundation of the law of new nations is the myth that law is an ideal of
balanced perfection created by that nation’s constitutional fathers and began anew
with the proclamation of that constitution. A Darwinian metaphor was seized by
late nineteenth-century jurists who saw law as a self-evolving, self-purifying entity to
be discovered or recovered by jurists across time.73 If law is no longer an emanation of
the will of the sovereign but an “entity” with the power to endlessly purify itself
through evolving case law and legislation, then its evolution will reflect the changing
social environment. It is perhaps not entirely coincidental that the nineteenth century
was a period of unprecedented reform in the governance of childhood in such areas
70. The rediscovery of Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis had a profound inf luence on the development of

common law principles governing the family; as of course did the ecclesiastical courts that applied
Roman law. See T. Lambert Mears, The Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, The Twelve Tables,
and the CXVIIITH and CXXVITH Novels (1882).

71.

Id. at 270.

72. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (James Strachey trans., 1950).

They revoked their deed by forbidding the killing of the totem, the substitute for their
father; and they renounced its fruits by resigning their claim to the women who had
now been set free. They thus created out of their filial sense of guilt the two fundamental
taboos of totemism, which for that very reason inevitably corresponded to the two
repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex.

Id. at 142.

This tumultuous mob of brothers were filled with the same contradictory feelings
which we can see at work in the ambivalent father complexes of our children and of our
neurotic patients. They hated their father, who presented such a formidable obstacle to
their craving for power and their sexual desires; but they loved and admired him too.

Id. at 143.

73. Peter Fitzpatrick writes:

[Law’s] entity is sustained despite the process of change by presenting transition as a
step from one state containing the entity to another [from the primitive to the modern,
and so on]. The overall transition is always one from the simple to the complex, from
the unified to the diverse . . . differentiation is always accompanied by a continued
social integration, by an encompassing order in which the part of law is heightened.
The entity in evolving responds to and overcomes the inadequacies of its prior form.

Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 195.
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as maternal access and custody, child labor, universal education, and protection from
physical and sexual abuse and exploitation.74
If modern law appears unconcerned with myths of origin, it continues to rely on
lesser myths—the majesty of its courts, the impartiality of its judges, the righteousness
of its edicts. Cases before the courts tell of passions and betrayals, love and fear, loss
and despair, hardship and travail, transgressions and reconciliations, and lessons
taught (and sometimes learned)—all the stuff of myth. Law draws upon mythic
understandings of self and other in delineating limits that must not be transgressed,
and in defining the punishment awaiting transgressors. It makes a special space for
certain transgressors, for children among others. That children must grow up is the
fundamental law of childhood. Infantia, without (legal) speech and therefore
innocent, becomes doli capax, capable of malice and deceit.75 Innocence yields to legal
subjectivity. If the child’s knowledge of good and evil brings expulsion from the
garden of childhood, it is myth that brings her safely through the gates.
Stories for children reflect law in its mythic infancy and original power. They do
more than shape the incipient subject of law. They are law. If childhood is a journey
toward law, and if legal subjectivity is to be understood as something more (or other)
than enforced obedience to fixed rules, then something more (or other) is needed than
the moral foreclosure of the didactic homily—the girl disobeys her mother; she is eaten
by a bear—and the positivist foreclosure of law. “You can’t pour didacticism down little
throats,”76 Seuss explains. “Oh, you might cram a little bit down. But it won’t stay down.
The little throats know how to spit it right out again.”77 That myth may be cloaked in
modernity and the tropes of the everyday does not diminish its transformative power.
The mythic is structured to reflect the everyday and the everyday invokes the mythic.
“For myth is the instant vision of a complex process,” Marshall McLuhan78 writes, the
moment in which that process contracts or implodes.79
Stories featuring child protagonists hold a special power. “The child motif
represents the preconscious, childhood aspect of the collective psyche.”80 The Child as
74.

See generally Anne McGillivray, Childhood in the Shadow of Parens Patriae, in Multiple Lenses,
Multiple Images: Perspectives on the Child Across Time, Space and Disciplines 38 (Hillel
Goelman, Shelia Marshall, & Sally Ross eds., 2004) [hereinafter McGillivray, Childhood in the Shadow
of Parens Patriae]; Anne McGillivray, Children’s Rights, Paternal Power and Fiduciary Duty: From Roman
Law to the Supreme Court of Canada, 18 Int’l J. Child. Rts. 21 (2012).

75. McGillivray, Childhood in the Shadow of Parens Patriae, supra note 74, at 42, 50.
76. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 188.
77.

Id.

78. Marshall McLuhan (1911–1980) was a Canadian philosopher who focused on the way we communicate.

See Terrence Gordon, Marshall Who?, marshallmcluhan.com, http://www.marshallmcluhan.com/
biography/ (July 2002).

79. Lewis Lapham, Introduction to Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of

Man 25 (MIT Press 1994) (1964).

80. C.G. Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, in 9 The Collected Works of C.G. Jung 1,

161 (William McGuire, et al. eds., R.C.F. Hull trans., 2d ed. 1981); see McGillivray, State of Imperfect
Transformation, supra note 21.
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an image “unites the opposites [as] a mediator, bringer of healing, that is, one who
makes whole.”81 This is the role of Horton’s Jo-Jo in the reconciliation of the Nools and
the Whos. The Child at the heart of myth symbolizes “the strongest, the most
ineluctable urge in every being, namely the urge to realize itself.”82 This self-realization
is powerfully expressed in Jo-Jo’s triumphant YOPP! The Child of contemporary
stories for children remains linked with the conception of childhood emergent in the
work of Locke and Rousseau; a “pure point of origin” with access to a lost world or a
primitive state of being which the child then restores to the adult.83 This view centers
the adult in stories for children. But what of the child for whom the story is made?
For Seuss, writing for children is a purposeful activity and that purpose is to
enhance children’s participation in civil society.84 “Children’s Reading and Children’s
Thinking are the rock bottom base upon which this country will rise. Or not rise . . .
writers are beginning to realize that books for children have a greater potential for
good, or evil, than any other form of literature on earth.”85 Stories for children, as
myth, are legal texts. This returns us to the question of adult purpose. Whose story
is it? As Jacqueline Rose86 asks, who is it who does not want Peter Pan to grow up?87
It is probably not his child reader. Where the aim of a story is to instill principles of
civility, we may similarly ask, whose law is it? If we are not to cram didacticism down
little throats, and if law requires a truly participatory subject who is transgressive,
81.

Jung, supra note 80, at 164.

82. Id. at 170.
83. Jacqueline Rose, The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction 10 (U.

Penn. Press rev. ed. 1992).

84. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 10, at 187–208; Nel, supra note 48, at 178.

It is of paramount importance that both Horton and the smallest Who act not only
each for himself, but also for the common good. Every individual is uniquely
responsible. Without the personal and individual acceptance of responsibility, the very
survival of the world is threatened. Dr. Seuss’s is thus not only a vision of individuals,
but of community. It rests upon a faith that the exercise of individuality will build and
strengthen social life. It will not initiate a dispersion into irreconcilable diversities but
rather will serve as a common ground for respecting differences and making possible
their expression and appreciation. As a social vision, it pledges itself to a community of
unique, participating individuals, without which the individuals themselves, with their
world, will perish.

Shira Wolosky, Democracy in America: By Dr. Seuss, 85 Southwest Rev. 167, 178 (2000).
85. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 187.

86. Jacqueline Rose is a Professor of English at Queen Mary, University of London. See Profile of Professor

Jacqueline Rose, Queen Mary U. of London, http://www.sed.qmul.ac.uk/staff/rosej.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2014).

87.

The child of children’s fiction is

the one the category itself sets in place, the one which it needs to believe is there for its
own purposes. . . . Suppose, therefore, that Peter Pan is a little boy who does not grow
up, not because he doesn’t want to, but because someone else prefers that he shouldn’t.
Suppose, therefore, that what is at stake in Peter Pan is the adult’s desire for the child.

Rose, supra note 83, at 3.
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choosing, and inventive, then a transgressive, choosing, and inventive protagonist is
required. We find this protagonist in, among others, the nonsense tradition of
Jonathan Swift, Edward Lear, Lewis Carroll, and Hilaire Belloc.88 Gulliver ponders
the nature of humanity in the foul Yahoos and their noble horses,89 Lear’s limericks
mock the Victorian morality tale,90 clever Alice solves the riddles set by Wonderland’s
childish adults,91 and Belloc’s Jim who, having failed to “keep a hold of Nurse / For
fear of finding something worse,” is eaten by a lion.92 We also find this protagonist in
the nonsense of Dr. Seuss. If the story is to have the mythic power that makes it law,
it must leave space for the reader to make her own intuitive leap to an understanding
of law. It cannot be didactic. As Seuss explains, “when we have a moral, we try to tell
it sideways.”93
Behind Horton flickers another kind of myth. This is Rolande Barthes’s94 “myth,
today,” produced by commercial and political words and images.95 In this ad-myth,
“there never is any contradiction, conflict, or split between the meaning and the
form.”96 It has “an imperative, buttonholing character: stemming from an historical
concept, directly springing from contingency . . . it is I whom it has come to seek. It
is turned towards me, I am subjected to its intentional force, it summons me . . . .” 97
It is “poverty-stricken. It does not know how to proliferate; being produced on order
88. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 189.
89. See generally Johnathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels (Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1992).
90. Edward Lear (1812–88) was an English author and poet, mostly known for his literary nonsense in his

limericks, a form he popularized. See Biography of Edward Lear, Poetry Found., http://www.
poetryfoundation.org/bio/edward-lear (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).

91.

See generally Lewis Carrol, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Lee & Shepard 1869).

92.

Hilaire Belloc, Jim, Who Ran Away from His Nurse and Was Eaten by a Lion, in Cautionary Tales for
Children: Designed for the Admonition of Children Between the Ages of Eight and
Fourteen Years 9, 16 (Alfred A. Knopf 1922).

93.

Jenkins, supra note 10, at 189.

94. Roland Barthes (1915–80) was a French philosopher and literary theorist. See Biography of Roland

Barthes, Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/54319/RolandBarthes (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).

95. Roland Barthes, Mythologies 107–09 (Annette Lavers trans., 1970).
96. Barthes writes further:

[I]f I am in a car and I look at the scenery through the window, I can at will focus on
the scenery or on the window-pane. At one moment I grasp the presence of the glass
and the distance of the landscape; at another, on the contrary, the transparency of the
glass and the depth of the landscape; but the result of this alternation is constant: the
glass is at once present and empty to me, and the landscape unreal and full. The same
thing occurs in the mythical signifier: its form is empty but present, its meaning absent
but full. To wonder at this contradiction I must voluntarily interrupt this turnstile of
form and meaning, I must focus on each separately, and apply to myth a static method
of deciphering, in short, I must go against its own dynamics: to sum up, I must pass
from the state of reader to that of mythologist.

Id. at 122.
97.

Id. at 123.

582

N

VOLUME 58 | 2013/14

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

and for a temporally limited prospect, it is invented with difficulty. It lacks a major
faculty, that of fabulizing.” 98 Barthes’s critique may apply to Theodore Geisel’s
advertisements in which Seussian characters first emerge.99 Whether the critique
applies to his books for children is a matter of taste, but what is clear is that, in both
his ad-cartoons and his children’s books, he displays “the great salesman’s gift for
distilling an idea, making it glamorous and amusing—selling without shouting.”100 If
what Seuss is selling is a transgressive, choosing, and inventive legal subject, then
this is the focus of a critical legal pluralism.
III.	“IT’S ALL FULL OF PERSONS! THEY’LL PROVE IT TO YOU!”101—VALIDATING THE
OTHER

Nested within the tale of Horton is a plurality of normative orders. A normative
order is a schema or worldview which may or may not have the authority of law, but
carries an authority, moral or otherwise. Most obvious of the normative orders in
Horton are the worlds of the Jungle of Nool and the dust-speck world of the Whos.
Within these worlds exists a plurality of orders whose representatives each seek to
validate those orders. Horton, having heard the Whos and sworn to protect them,
must validate their order by proving their reality to his fellow Nools. The Mayor of
Who-ville, whose office requires that he preserve the Who order, must summon every
citizen of Who-ville to prove the existence, the reality, of that order. The sour
kangaroo, self-appointed ruler of Nool, has dedicated herself to preserving a Noolian
order that includes no Whos. The Who-child Jo-Jo must decide whether the cause of
the Whos is worthy of interrupting his own normative reality, a sort of sullen solitude.
Only when Horton of the Nools and the Mayor of the Whos join the authority of
their respective orders does Jo-Jo respond to the needs of the larger Who order.
The lens of legal pluralism helps to show how competing normative orders are
navigated and mediated by their subjects. Legal pluralism is a way of thinking about
law which recognizes the coexistence of a plurality of legal orders and a plurality of
sites of normativity, of other forms of ordering which may or may not be characterized
as law.102 The daily horoscope, one’s elders, one’s street gang, or Oprah may play a
stronger role than law in shaping thought, conduct, and the form of everyday life. If
“knowledge is a process of creating and maintaining myths about realities” and legal
98. Id. at 148.
99. A proto-Horton is seen in a Flit ad showing a circus elephant watching a tightrope-walker. See Jim

Edwards, These Ads Drawn by Dr Seuss Before He Was Famous Are Utterly Charming, Bus. Insider (Jan.
30, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-ads-drawn-by-dr-suess-before-he-was-famous-areutterly-charming-2012-1?op=1/ links.

100. Richard Corliss, That Old Feeling: Seuss on First, Time (Mar. 2, 2004), http://www.time.com/time/arts/

article/0,8599,597240,00.html.

101. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
102. See generally Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick Macdonald, What Is a Critical Legal Pluralism?, 12

Can. J.L. & Soc’y 25 (1997); McGillivray, State of Imperfect Transformation, supra note 21, at 10–28.
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knowledge is about “creating and maintaining self-understandings,”103 then a critical
legal pluralism takes this a step further by situating legal order within the individual
subject of law. The legal subject becomes a subject of a plurality of normative orders.
In navigating between orders, she becomes a law-inventing, law-subverting genetrix
of normativity. In this view, law is neither outside nor above its subjects. It is not a
matter of fiat but of reciprocal construction. Law exists “within all members of any
society that purports to recognize them as legal subjects.”104
Horton is a picture-book. If a normative order is also a schema, then a discussion of
the worlds in Horton must also include Seuss’s illustrations. As Louis Menand105 notes
of The Cat in the Hat,106 a “Beginner Book” written three years and four books after
Horton, it “stood for the idea that language skills—and many other subjects—ought to
be taught through illustrated storybooks, rather than primers and textbooks.”107 The
idea can be traced to Comenius, a seventeenth-century educator who understood that
illustrations carry at least as much information as text, and that pictures teach more
than words.108 The child sees the story in the words and the story in the pictures, each
conveying different subtle meanings. Horton’s palette consists of a suffused blue paling
into greyed-out baby-blues and a pink saturating into deep crimson. Outlines are black
and bold. Maurice Sendak terms the style “a private Seussian dreamscape” of “slippery,
sloppery, curvy, altogether delicious Art Deco palazzos” that “invite you to slide and
bump along, in and out of flaming colored mazes . . . past grand, even apocalyptic,
oceans and skies.”109 Elements of surrealism, Dadaism, Gaudi, Dali, art deco, M.C.
Escher, and even Picasso can be identified. Jon Agee110 attempts a definition: “Seussism
(\o7 Soos-izm\f7 ), n. Fine Arts. A style of art characterized chiefly by a grandubulous
103. Kleinhans & Macdonald, supra note 102, at 35.
104. Id. at 46.
105. Louis Menand is the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University. See

Biography of Louis Menand, Harv. U., http://english.fas.harvard.edu/faculty/menand/ (last visited
Mar. 12, 2014).

106. Dr. Seuss, The Cat in the Hat (1957).
107. Louis Menand, Cat People: What Dr. Seuss Really Taught Us, New Yorker (Dec. 23, 2002), http://www.

newyorker.com/archive/2002/12/23/021223crat_atlarge?currentPage=all.

108. Picture books have been used to instruct children since Comenius published his Orbis Sensualium Pictus

in Nuremberg in 1658. “An enlightened and illustrated Latin vocabulary, with words in German, Latin,
Italian and French,” it was translated into English by Charles Hoole in 1659 as Orbis Sensualium Pictus…
Visible World; or A Nomenclature and Pictures of All the Chief Things that Are in the World. In 1664, Festin
Corin published his English illustrated alphabet, The Childes First Tutor: or, The Master and Mistris—
Teaching Children an Easie and Delightful Way to Learn the Twenty Four Letters. See Historical Survey of
Children’s Literature in the British Library, Brit. Libr., www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpsubject/literature/
chillit/childhist/childhistorical.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). Orbis Pictus was used in European and
North American children’s education for over two centuries. Jean Piaget, Jan Amos Comenius, 23
Prospects 173 (1993).

109. Maurice Sendak, Introduction to Audrey Geisel, The Secret Art of Dr. Seuss (Random House

1995).

110. Jon Agee is an author of children’s books. See Biography of Jon Agee, jonagee.com, http://www.

jonagee.com/html/bio.php?nav=2&sub=0 (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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sense of ornamentation and color, where exotic, snergelly architecture twists, turns and
schloops into countless grickelly filigrees and flourishes . . . .”111 The myth of Horton is
enhanced by the floating timelessness of its fantastical landscapes, its gravity-defying
architecture, and its weird dwellers, some of whom are barely subliminally identifiable
(bugs?)112 but familiar as family.
A second schema in Horton is its odd, compelling rhyme. Words, some freely
invented, are arranged in rhymed anapestic dimeter,113 an arresting riffing galloping
rap that creates a second world of sound and sense joined by rhythm. Seuss’s rhyming
is not the sort of poetry114 that prohibits translation, whether academic or linguistic.
As Claude Lévi-Strauss115 explains,
Poetry is a kind of speech which cannot be translated except at the cost of
serious distortions; whereas the mythical value of the myth is preserved even
through the worst translation. Myth is language, functioning on an especially
high level where meaning succeeds practically at ‘taking off ’ from the linguistic
ground on which it keeps on rolling.116

Pictures and words convey the conf licting, competing normative values of the
characters in the story. The title page shows a quizzical elephant looking out at the
reader, having perhaps just noticed a random house in the field behind him. This
draws our attention to the world of publishing (Random House) and to the
incongruity of either the house or the elephant. There is a dedication, “For My Great
Friend, Mitsugi Nakamura of Kyoto, Japan.”117 The Japanese cities of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were bombed into oblivion by American forces nine years before the book
appeared.118 But that is another world and we do not dwell there.
We turn the page. We are transported to a pool in the Jungle of Nool in which a
blissful elephant soaks. He is Horton, and he hears “a small noise . . . a very faint
111. Jon Agee, The 500 Cats of Theodor Geisel: The Secret Art of Dr. Seuss, L.A. Times (Dec. 3, 1995), http://

articles.latimes.com/1995-12-03/books/bk-9687_1_secret-art.

112. A conversation between Seuss and his editor Helen Geisel confirms the uncertainty:

“Now he looks like a bug,” [stated Helen].
“Well, they are bugs,” said [Seuss] defensively.
“They are not bugs,” replied Helen. “Those Whos are just small people.”

Philip Nel, Dr. Seuss: American Icon 110 (2004).
113. See id. at 16–21.
114. Id., on whether Seuss-rhyme is ‘poetry’.

115. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009) was a French anthropologist and ethnologist. See Edward Rothstein,

Claude Lévi-Strauss, 100, Dies; Altered Western Views on the ‘Primitive’, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2009),
http://nyti.ms/qALOGu.

116. Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 21.
117. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
118. But see Nel, supra note 48, at 77 (“While the Whos could represent children or any minority populations,

given that the book was written upon Seuss’s return from Japan and . . . influenced by his visits to Japanese
schools, it is reasonable to assume that Seuss was thinking of the Japanese people when he created these
Whos [but to equate Horton with the United States] may press this parallel a bit too much.”).
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yelp / As if some tiny person were calling for help.” Another world has floated into
the everyday world of the jungle. Horton is a logical beast. As specks of dust “are not
able to yell,” he concludes that “there must / Be someone on top of that small speck
of dust! / Some sort of creature of very small size.” He makes an empathetic leap,
envisioning “some poor little person who’s shaking with fear.” He makes a promise:
“I’ll just have to save him.” He justifies it, first, on the argument that “Because, after
all, / A person’s a person, no matter how small” and, later, by his own bulk: “I’ve got
to protect them. I’m bigger than they.”119
The sour kangaroo, the joey120 in her pouch, the simian Wickersham Brothers,
and the black-bottomed eagle Vlad Vlad-i-koff see nothing on the dust-speck. Nor
can Horton. He can only hear. He continues to listen to the voice on the speck
through the noisy derision of his fellow Nools. “‘I think you’re a fool!’ laughed the
sour kangaroo / And the young kangaroo in her pouch said, ‘Me too! / You’re the
biggest blame fool in the Jungle of Nool!’” The jungle creatures join in the derision:
“Through the high jungle tree tops, the news quickly spread: / ‘He talks to a dustspeck! He’s out of his head!’” Why, we will ask, are the jungle creatures so worked
up? What is the harm in talking to a speck of dust? We stand with Horton, who
learns that the voice on the speck is that of the Mayor of the tiny world of Who-ville,
“a town that is friendly and clean” where Whos push prams and lawn-mowers, shop,
type, and play ball amid twisted, canting housing complexes joined by impossibly
cantilevered stairways.121 Who-ville and its inhabitants are visible only to the reader.
The reader has also seen the small fearful figure and the tiny terrified family pictured
in Horton’s imagination. Does this mean that Who-ville, too, exists only in Horton’s
mind? If we think so, we will have allied ourselves with the jeering Nools. What
proof do we (and they) need?
Seeing may be believing, but hearing is evidence. Audi alteram partem, the first
branch of natural justice, applies even in Nool, and Horton’s hearsay is rejected. The
Wickersham monkeys take charge, shouting, “What rot! / This elephant’s talking to
Whos who are not! / There aren’t any Whos! And they don’t have a Mayor! / And we’re
going to stop all this nonsense! So there!” They snatch the clover on which Horton has
placed the dust-speck and give it to the black-bottomed eagle. Horton follows the
eagle across stony crags begging, “Please do not harm all my little folks who / Have as
much right to live as bigger folks do!” The blue which colored his blissful pool at the
beginning of the tale now suffuses the pages with the darkness of night. At precisely
6:56 a.m., the eagle drops the clover into “a great patch of clover a hundred miles
wide! / ‘Find THAT!’ sneered the bird.” Horton tries. “And by noon, poor old Horton,
more dead than alive, / Had picked, searched, and piled up, nine thousand and five.”
Not until “the three millionth flower” does he find the right one.122
119. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
120. A “ joey” is a baby kangaroo.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Who-ville has suffered much damage to its teapots. Horton’s suffering at the
hands of the Nools has just begun. The sour kangaroo, now self-appointed prosecutrix
of the law of the Jungle of Nool, convicts him of some version of breaching the peace:
“Such carryings-on in our peaceable jungle! / We’ve had quite enough of your
bellowing bungle!” Horton is to be roped and caged. “And as for your dust-speck . . .
hah! That we shall boil / In a hot steaming kettle of Beezle-Nut oil!” Horton answers,
“Oh, that you can’t do! / It’s all full of persons! / They’ll prove it to you!” The denizens
of Who-ville cry out in 9-point type, “We are here! We are here! We are here! We
are here!” The kangaroo hears only the breeze. She instructs her joey: “I heard no
small voices. And you didn’t either.” The rope is carried in, the Beezle-Nut oil is
steaming, and Horton is tied foot and tail. Despite resisting “with great vigor and
vim,” he is horribly mauled and beaten. He begs the Whos to shout louder. It is not
enough. “Is anyone shirking?” Horton asks. The Mayor’s search brings him to one
small, silent Who-child who joins his voice to the clamor of the Whos. The invisible
becomes audible. The Whos are heard. Horton delivers his closing argument:
“They’ve proved they ARE persons, no matter how small. / And their whole world
was saved by the Smallest of All!” The kangaroo and her joey pledge themselves to
protecting the Whos and the gathering monkeys beam with approval.123 Wisdom is
gained. The people are reconciled.
Why are the jungle creatures angry? Talking to imaginary people is eccentric,
not criminal, yet Horton is nearly lynched for it. This visceral response to difference
is the law of the jungle. In its violence and cruelty, its retaliatory focus, its lack of a
rule of law, the law of the jungle is the metaphorical antithesis of law. Horton is
charged with breaching the peace by inflaming others. But he asked only a personal
favor—“So please . . . as a favor to me, / Try not to disturb them. Just please let them
be.”124 Only when his undertaking to the Whos is compromised by the threat to his
own safety does he rebel. If anyone has disturbed the peace, it is the sour kangaroo.
The jungle sees it differently. Horton’s knowledge threatens the fundamental order
of things. New people, people who are different and (socially) invisible, claim rights
against the collectivity. Long-held beliefs are threatened. Having laid the charge,
established guilt, set the penalty, and hired enforcers, the kangaroo is Horton’s judge,
jury, and executioner. Hers is a kangaroo court.125 Her priority is to keep her world
safe for her joey. Sameness is safest. Difference is danger. If the Whos are real, the
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The phrase first appears in the magazine stories of Philip Paxton (Samuel Adams Hammett), published

as A Stray Yankee in Texas. “By an unanimous vote, Judge G.—the fattest and funniest of the assembly—
was elected to the bench, and the ‘Mestang’ or ‘Kangaroo Court’ regularly organized.” Philip Paxton,
A Stray Yankee in Texas 205 (1853). The reference is to the itinerant frontier courts of the midnineteenth-century American West. “These roving judges were paid on the basis of how many trials
they conducted, and in some instances their salary depended on the fines from the defendants they
convicted. The term kangaroo court comes from the image of these judges hopping from place to place,
guided less by concern for justice than by the desire to wrap up as many trials as the day allowed.”
West’s Encyclopedia of American Law 103 (2d ed. 2005).
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safe sameness of her joey’s future is threatened and, worse, she will be proven wrong,
undermining her authority in the eyes of Nool and her joey.
Horton as defender of the Who world, and the kangaroo as prosecutrix for the
Nool world, represent competing normative orders. In one version of reality, the
Whos exist. In the other, they do not. This problem is a familiar one to courts of law,
as it is to the subject of multiple normative orders. Can these competing visions be
reconciled? Which world, which order, is real? If both are real, is one subsidiary to
the other? This intranormative conf lict “f lows only from its recognition and
acknowledgment by the legal subject-self.”126 The Nools do not believe in the
existence of the Whos, but the Whos do not doubt the existence of the Nools. The
balance of physical power favors the Nools, but the balance of knowledge-power, of
moral suasion, favors the Whos. Only the Nool Horton has heard the Whos. Having
accepted their personhood he, as a Noolian subject, cannot submit to their
extermination under Noolian law. For him, there is no conf lict, “no a priori
distinction between normative orders because these normative orders [Whos and
Nools] cannot exist outside the creative capacity of their subjects.”127 The creative
capacity to accept and to rationalize conflicting normative orders is Horton’s gift as
the messenger. He feels no need to seek “a separation, nor an eventual hierarchical
reconciliation, of multiple legal orders” and understands that within and between
orders or worlds, there is heterogeneity.128 Nools differ from other Nools, and Whos
from other Whos, just as their worlds differ from each other.
“How legal subjects recognize and react to relations within and between these
regimes” brings tension.129 The tension lies not just in disparity of knowledge. Horton
knows the Whos are real. The kangaroo rejects not only his evidence but also his claim
that persons exist outside her world. The turmoil of the Nools is the fear of the other.
That they hid the clover on which Horton placed the Whos, rather than destroy it,
suggests that they suspect not only that the Whos exist, but also that they may be
persons with equal claim to the respect and protection of the law. With Jo-Jo’s YOPP!
the tension is resolved. A person is a person, however small. Other worlds, other
normative orders, exist. With Jo-Jo’s cry comes the wisdom that no world of conscious,
sentient beings is subsidiary to one’s own. This, the essence of the messenger’s gift in
every myth, reflects the pluralist approach to an understanding of law.
We see the joy of the jungle, we imagine the jubilation of the Whos, and we
picture Horton again at peace in his blissful blue pool. What of the Who-child, the
child who united these opposites, and who lies at the heart of myth as mediator, as
the one who makes whole—Jo-Jo the young twerp of an order all his own?

126. Kleinhans & Macdonald, supra note 102, at 44.
127. Id. at 40.
128. Id. at 39 (“Normative heterogeneity exists both between various normative regimes which inhabit the

same intellectual space, and within the regimes themselves.”).

129. Id.
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IV.	“Persons who’ve never existed”130 —the world-saving rightsyearning Seussian child

“Is anyone shirking?” a desperate Horton asks the Mayor of Who-ville.
Don’t give up! I believe in you all!

A person’s a person, no matter how small!

And you very small persons will not have to die

If you make yourselves heard! So come on, now, and TRY! . . .

They don’t hear a thing! Are you sure all your boys

Are doing their best? Are they ALL making noise?

Are you sure every Who down in Who-ville is working?

Quick! Look through your town! Is there anyone shirking?131

The Mayor’s search for a shirker is mapped on a stepped, snaking, crimson path
ending at Fairfax Apartment 12J where a tiny figure dressed in crimson stands alone,
his back to the door, his nose in the air, and a smirk on his face. He knows what is
going on and he does not care. He is the kind of child who, in Fifties talk, is cruising
for a bruising. He is “[a] very small, very small shirker named Jo-Jo” and he is
“standing, just standing, and bouncing a Yo-Yo! / Not making a sound! Not a yipp!
Not a chirp!” The Mayor grabs “the young twerp” and, leading him up an Escher
stairway, lectures him on red-bloodedness and the need to come to the aid of his
country in its darkest hour. “So, open your mouth, lad! For every voice counts!”132 “I
too am not a bit tamed—I too am untranslatable; I sound my barbaric yawp over the
roofs of the world,” Walt Witman writes.133 Precariously balanced on the Mayor’s
outstretched hand atop the spherical tip of the swaying lightning-rod of the town’s
highest tower, over the roofs of the Who-world, the untamed Jo-Jo “cleared his throat
and he shouted out ‘YOPP!’”134
That both worlds are saved by the Smallest of All! together with the visual
prominence given to Jo-Jo, the emphasis on his physical insignificance among the
physically insignificant Whos, and Seuss’s views on childhood suggest that Horton is
a fable of childhood. The plight of the Whos is a metaphor of the child’s yearning for
the right to be heard and for autonomy, for self-determination—not as a demographic,
a psychological subject, a consumer, an object of protection, or a future citizen—but
as a child. “I want to see a bunch of scrappy kids talking back to us,” Seuss writes.
“And I want to sit [there] and tell the kid ‘O.K., Bud, I think . . . you’re wrong. But if

130. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Whitman, supra note 4.
134. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
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you’re so sure of yourself that you think the back steps need to be painted magenta—
get your gang together and paint them magenta. We’ll buy the paint.’”135
Horton tells of the mythic journey of Horton and his people and hints at the
journey of the child Jo-Jo toward a transgressive legal subjectivity. Because this is a
story, we suspect that the journeys of the messenger and the child, who meet only at
the story’s apotheosis, must on some level be parallel. We know what the messenger
suffered at the hands of his people. What did Jo-Jo suffer? Why is he alone, and why
is he alone among the Whos in his refusal to participate in their world-saving cry?
He is the only named Who, his voice is heard across worlds, he saves his people from
extermination, and Nool from its racist insularity and the atrocity of genocide. He is
a shirker according to Horton, and a young twerp according to the Mayor. He does
not seem to be a particularly cute or lovable child. Even in his moment of triumph,
he does not seem happy. “Children are thwarted people,” Seuss observed. “Their idea
of tragedy is when some one says you can’t do that.”136 Jo-Jo’s YOPP! is affirmation
that he can. His accomplishment requires the mythic authority of the messenger and
the civic authority of the Mayor but the decision and the power are his own. The
story turns on hearing the child.
Henry Jenkins137 describes the Seussian child as “born in an edenic state, outside
of adult corruption, yet already possessing, as a birthright, the virtues of a democratic
citizen—a sense of fairness and justice, a hunger to belong and participate within the
community.”138 Protecting children from corrupting, undemocratic adults and
authoritarian institutions is the challenge Seuss set for himself.139 Children, he
believed, must “respect and trust their own internal responses to an unjust world.”140
His fables intentionally subvert authority. The Seussian child, then, is a rights-instinct,
rights-bearing child who is acutely conscious of injustice and unfairness. This child is
a person in law deserving of dignity, equality, and respect. The idea that children are

135. Nel, supra note 112, at 93. In a 2004 NBC Today Show interview, Audrey Geisel said of Seuss, “He was

afraid of children to a degree” and was unnerved by their unpredictability. “What might they do next?
What might they ask next? . . . No, he couldn’t just sit down on the floor and play with children. It was
none of that. He just had to do what he had to do, and they loved him. And he loved them for loving
what he did.” Associated Press, Seussentenial: 100 years of Dr. Seuss, Today (Feb. 26, 2004), http://www.
today.com/id/4362025/site/todayshow/ns/today-entertainment/t/seussentenial-years-dr-seuss/#.
USp60lfLVmd.

136. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 196.
137. Henry Jenkins is Provost’s Professor of Communication, Journalism, Cinematic Arts and Education at

the University of Southern California Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism. See
Biography of Henry Jenkins, USC, http://annenberg.usc.edu/Faculty/Communication%2520and%2520
Journalism/JenkinsH.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).

138. Id. at 188.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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born with a moral instinct,141 and very possibly a legal or rulemaking one,142 is
supported by contemporary research. Children are thwarted in the exercise of their
rights and it causes them great pain. This underlies Seuss’s 1953 musical film The
5000 Fingers of Dr. T.143
Released the year before Horton was published, the film tells of a megalomaniac
pianist who enslaves five hundred children to perform his musical masterpiece.144
The child Bart, anagram of brat and brother in spirit to Jo-Jo the twerp, calls for a
children’s revolution.145 “People should always believe in kids,” says the film’s musicloving plumber August Zabladowski.146 “They should even believe their lies.”147 Bart’s
poignant solo captures the essence of children’s yearning for rights and challenges
the supposed ‘right’ of adults to physically punish and emotionally abuse and exploit
them:148
Now just because we’re kids, Because we’re sort of small,

Because we’re closer to the ground And you are bigger pound by pound,

You have no right, You have no right To push and shove us little kids around.
Now just because your throat Has got a deeper voice
And lots of wind to blow it out

At little kids who don’t dare shout, You have no right, You have no right
To boss and beat us little kids about.

Just because you’ve whiskers on your face to shave, You treat us like a slave . . . .
You know that isn’t fair . . . .

I’d hate to grow, Like some I know,

Who push and shove us little kids around.149
141. See The Nature of Things: Babies: Born To Be Good? (CBC television broadcast Jul. 4, 2013), available at

http://www.cbc.ca/player/Shows/Shows/The+Nature+of+Things/ID/2296544019/ (“Psychologists
have made breakthroughs in our understanding of what babies might be thinking, and what they could
possibly know about justice, helping, honesty, fairness. Even before they learn to talk.”); see also Roxanne
Khamsi, Babies Can Spot the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, New Scientist (Nov. 22, 2007, 10:44 AM),
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn12948-babies-can-spot-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly.html.
apes-rolling-up-a-hill-article/.

142. See Michael D. Guttentag, Is There a Law Instinct?, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 269 (2010).
143. See The 5000 Fingers of Dr. T (Columbia Pictures 1953) (story, script, and lyrics written by Theodore

Geisel).

144. Id.
145. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
146. Corliss, supra note 101.
147. Id.
148. Tommy Rettig, Because We’re Kids, on The 5000 Fingers of Dr. T (Mater Classics Records 2009). The

solo is available for purchase at http://www.screenarchives.com/title_detail.cfm/ID/14536/THE5000-FINGERS-OF-DR-T-/.

149. Id.
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If grown-ups “have no right to boss and beat us little kids about” and “push and
shove the little kids around” and “treat us like a slave,” then there must be a right of
the child not to be bossed, beaten, pushed, shoved, and enslaved.150 If “little kids . . .
don’t dare shout” because grown-ups prevent them from being heard, then there
must be a right of the child to be heard.151 If grown-ups get away with it “just because
we’re sort of small” and they are “bigger by the pound,” then might makes right and
“[y]ou know that isn’t fair.”152
The U.S. Supreme Court in its 1967 decision In re Gault established the right of
the child to due process of law, stating: “Under our Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”153 Jo-Jo’s self-imposed isolation
suggests that he, with Horton, has felt the burning injustice of a kangaroo court. His
peremptory treatment by the Mayor suggests that the Whos treat children much as
we often do—bossing, beating, pushing and shoving, and silencing them in judicial
and quasi-judicial proceedings as well as informal ones at home and school. The
basis of due process and the basis of dignity and respect is the right to be heard.
Gault marked a shift from a welfare protectivist approach to children to one based on
rights.154 While the decision is directed at the legal treatment of delinquent children,
all children may claim the rights promised to “all men” in the U.S. Constitution and
elaborated in its Bill of Rights and do have the rights promised to “everyone” in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.155
If promised rights are empty rights, “the very emptiness provides a vessel to be
filled with possibility, with a plurality of autonomous yearnings.”156 It is easy for
those like the sour kangaroo who, secure in their rights, power, and privilege, and
willfully deaf to the rights-claims of others, to claim that rights-discourse is barren,
or that children have no rights and no need for them. Children cannot do it alone.
Nor can the Whos. It may take a Horton to champion their cause, but lack of power
is no bar to the status of rights-bearer. Rights are not about an improbable John
Wayne autonomy gained at the point of a gun or some other emblem of power, nor
150. Corliss, supra note 100.
151. The 5000 Fingers of Dr. T, supra note 143.
152. Rettig, supra note 148.
153. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
154. The decision was significant in Canadian youth justice reform. See generally Nicholas Bala & Sanjeev

Anand, Youth Criminal Justice Law (2d ed. 2009).

155. Anne McGillivray, Why Children Do Have Equal Rights: In Reply to Laura Purdy, 2 Int’l J. Child. Rts.

243 (1994) [hereinafter McGillvray, In Reply to Laura Purdy].

156. Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: The Diary of a Law Professor 16 (1991).

In the law, rights are islands of empowerment. To be unrighted is to be dis-empowered,
and the line between rights and no-rights is most often the line between dominators and
oppressed. Rights contain images of power and manipulating those images, either visually
or linguistically, is central in the making and maintenance of rights. In principle,
therefore, the more dizzyingly diverse the images that are propagated, the more
empowered we will be as a society.

Id. at 233–34.
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are they a libertarian license to do as one wills.157 They are nodes in web-works of
relationships of the sort that lets autonomy flourish.158 They are markers of equality
signifying mutual respect. Rights recognize the shared qualities, needs, and
relationships of humans. Rights in their essence are about the human condition. The
discourse is not barren, nor is it finished. Under the will or agency theory of rights,
rights flow from power, autonomy, and rationality. Those lacking these attributes are
excluded, making rights discourse the chosen discourse of the dispossessed. Like the
Whos, children’s rights-invisibility derives not from some set of qualities they lack,
but from size—“because we’re sort of small”—which is equated with power and thus
with the status of rights-bearer. The interest theory of rights has no such exclusions,
basing rights not on power, but on those interests which are sufficient ground to hold
another to a duty.159 Rights are no longer a zero-sum game. In the sour kangaroo we
see reflected the common fear that according rights to children will threaten adult
rights, rule, and authority.160 When she at last accepts the personhood of the Whos,
her fear is transformed into joy. No one’s rights, not even those of an officious
demagogue of a kangaroo, are diminished by the fact that others also enjoy them.
V.	“We are here! We are here! We are here! We are here!”161—children’s
rights and children’s bodies

Children’s rights were given universal expression with the signing of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) by the U.N. General Assembly on
November 20, 1989. More states took part in its signing, it was proclaimed in force
more quickly, and it was ratified by more states than any U.N. human rights treaty
before or since.162 The United States signed the CRC six years later, on February 16,
1995.163 Its failure to ratify the CRC, though, joins it with only South Sudan and
157. McGillivray, In Reply to Laura Purdy, supra note 155; McGillivray, Children’s Rights, supra note 67; Anne

McGillivray, Nowhere to Stand: Correction by Force in the Supreme Court of Canada, in Children and
the Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Nicholas Bala (Sanjeev Anand ed., 2011).

158. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 Rev. Const. Stud. 1, 7 (1993).
159. See generally J. Raz, Legal Rights, 4 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984). “To say that a person has a right is to

say that an interest of his is sufficient ground for holding another to be subject to a duty . . . .” Id. at 5.

160. Some fundamentalist groups oppose children’s rights as an interference with parental and religious

authority, and specifically with their use of corporal punishment. See, e.g., The Home School Legal
Defense Association’s Position Statement on the CRC, ParentalRights.org, http://www.parentalrights.
org/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={30FF0076-5974-4B3C-B658-BBF7931E3EF8}&DE= (last
visited Mar. 12, 2014); Corporal Punishment: Is It a No-No?, Home Sch. Ct. Rep., Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996,
available at http://www.hslda.org/courtreport/V11N6/V11N6CA.asp?PrinterFriendly=True.

161. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
162. Cynthia Price Cohen, The Role of the United States in the Drafting of The Convention on the Rights of the

Child, 20 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 185, 185 (2006).

163. Luisa Blanchfield, Cong. Res. Serv., R40484, The United Nations Convention on the

Rights of the Child: Background and Policy Issues 1 (2012).

The George W. Bush Administration opposed the Convention, citing “serious political
and legal concerns” with its impact on sovereignty and parental rights. . . . [Noting]
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Somalia.164 President Obama once, however, expressed interest in pursuing the
possibility of ratification.165 The signing of the CRC took place eleven days after the
Berlin Wall fell. With it fell the communist threat which had been, as Jeremy Gunn166
observes, “a core theme of American political life for more than forty years.”167 The
CRC took its place as “fodder in the American ‘culture wars’” waged by the religious
right whose opposition continues to block U.S. ratification.168 “Ironically,” Gunn
notes, the U.S. State Department under the Reagan and George H.W. Bush
administrations “played an active and extremely influential role in shaping the text of
the document.”169
Of the three treaties flowing directly from the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,170 the CRC is the most detailed expression of the rights set out in
that while CRC may be a useful tool for protecting children in countries that have
ratified it, it was “misleading and inappropriate” to use the Convention as a “litmus
test” for measuring the United States’ commitment to children.

Id. at 6 (citations omitted).

164. The United States, Somalia and South Sudan are the only states which have not ratified the CRC. The

Convention on the Rights of the Child: (Almost) the Entire World Endorses Child Rights, UNICEF USA,
http://www.unicefusa.org/campaigns/public-policy-advocacy/the-convention-on-the-rights.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2014). On becoming a U.N. member state in 2011, Somalia has signaled strong support
for ratification, and had its first formal parliament in over twenty years sworn in August 20, 2012.
Children’s Rights in Somalia, U.N. Child. Rights (Aug. 27, 2012), http://unchildrights.blogspot.
ca/2010/05/childrens-rights-in-somalia.html. The United States signed the CRC in 1995 but it has not
been submitted to Senate where a two-thirds majority is required, hearings may be called, and a decision
must be made on whether it is to be self-executing and thus directly enforceable in the courts, or nonself-executing and therefore non-binding absent further legislation. Blanchfield, supra note 163, at 1.
Canada ratified the CRC in 1991 after reviewing compatibility with federal and provincial law. See
Current Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Treaty Collection, https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 12,
2014). The CRC is not self-executing in Canada, nor has it been enacted as domestic law, but it plays a
significant role in youth justice and a lesser one in judicial interpretation of fiduciary duty and children’s
rights. See, e.g., Baker v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 860–62 (Can.).

165. Responding to a question on whether the United States intended to ratify the CRC raised at the 2008

Presidential Youth Debate, President Obama stated: “It is embarrassing to find ourselves [the United
States] in the company of Somalia, a lawless land. I will review this [treaty] and other treaties and
ensure that the United States resumes its global leadership in human rights.” See Blanchfield, supra
note 163, at 5 n.19.

166. Jeremy Gunn is a human rights activist and scholar and an Associate Professor in the School of

Humanities and Social Sciences at Al Akhawayn University in Morocco. See Biography of Jeremy
Gunn, Ctr. for the Study of L. & Religion, http://cslr.law.emory.edu/people/person/name/gunn/
(last visited Mar. 12, 2014).

167. T. Jeremy Gunn, The Religious Right and the Opposition to U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights

of the Child, 20 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 111, 111 (2006). Professor Gunn is Director of the ACLU Program
on Freedom of Religion and Belief and a Senior Fellow in Religion and Human Rights at Emory
University School of Law.

168. Id. at 111–12.
169. Id.
170. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). The

other two treaties are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
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the Declaration. The Declaration Drafting Committee was chaired by Eleanor
Roosevelt, its work in part inspired by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, in
turn inspired by H.G. Wells’s concept of a universal declaration of rights.171 Canadian
law professor John Humphrey, Director of the U.N. Division of Human Rights
within the U.N. Secretariat, prepared the initial crucial draft, and much of the final
draft, of the CRC. The non-binding 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child,172
like the 1924 Geneva Declaration,173 speaks of doing things “to” and “for” children,
as in helping, feeding, sheltering, reclaiming, and protecting. Seven of its ten
principles are directed to care and protection. In using the language of rights rather
than protection, the CRC recognizes children as rights-bearers.174 Although the
United States had no intent to ratify the CRC at the time of its drafting,175 its
influence on the decade-long drafting process was such that the convention was
called “the US child rights treaty.”176 As Cynthia Price Cohen, U.S. contributor to
the CRC drafting committee observes, “It may be true that U.S. proposals for articles
protecting children’s civil rights were inspired more by the desire to irritate the Soviet
Union than from any grand philosophy regarding children’s rights.”177 It also may be
true that civil rights are conceptually available to children and their advocates in part
because of the influence of Seuss’s stories for children and Horton in particular. The
Cold War continued through the decade of the CRC’s drafting. In Horton, Seuss
twists that potent symbol of democracy and power, the American bald eagle, into the
sinister Cold War Commie black-bottomed eagle Vlad Vlad-i-koff, “a mighty strong
eagle, of very swift wing” who readily agrees to “get rid of this thing”—the clover on
which rests a rights-claiming child standing on his dust-speck world.
The quintessential right claimed by the Seussian child is the right to be heard. To
honor the 1979 International Year of the Child, Poland proposed a binding children’s
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR], and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). The CRC, like the Declaration, sets out civil
rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and humanitarian rights in a single document.
171. McGillivray, The Long Awaited, supra note 21, at 215.
172. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 3.
173. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, League of Nations, O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 21 at 43 (1924).
174. CRC, supra note 3, art. 12.
175. Cynthia Price Cohen, who participated in drafting the CRC, writes:

It should also be remembered that the Working Group drafted the Convention during
the conservative Reagan administration, which had adopted a generally negative
attitude toward this perceived Eastern Bloc treaty. In 1983, for example, the U.S.
delegate essentially stated that the United States would never ratify the Convention but
was participating in the drafting process primarily so that these other countries would
have a better treaty.

Cohen, supra note 162, at 188.

176. Id. at 190. The U.S. delegation “not only added a number of new rights to the Convention, but it also

wielded the power through the consensus process to prevent other rights from being included.” Id. at 191.

177. Id. at 191.
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rights treaty to be ready for adoption by the United Nations in 1989.178 Poland’s second
draft gave the child “who is capable of forming his own views the right to express his
opinion in matters concerning his own person.”179 This single civil right signified the
emergence of the child as rights-bearer. From the right to be heard, now Article
12(1)180 of the CRC, flowed related rights to freedom of association,181 expression and
information,182 and freedom of thought, conscience, and belief.183 All were initiated by
the U.S. delegation to the drafting committee. The right to be heard is the lynchpin
of the CRC. As in the Gault ruling, it turns welfare into rights, and saves children
from the dark side of the best-interests principle184 where indeterminate interests of
the child are subsumed under competing adult desires.185 Even so, if rights are to
function as markers of relationships of equality, then they must be balanced with
other rights and considerations. The weight given to the child’s right to be heard in all
matters affecting the child is tempered by the child’s age and maturity. If what the
child desires is manifestly and provably not in her best interests, then her voice will
178. Id. at 186–87.
179. Id. at 189.
180. Article 12 provides:

1.	States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity
of the child.
2.	For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be
heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent
with the procedural rules of national law.

CRC, supra note 3, art. 12.
181. Id. art. 15.
182. Article 13 provides that:

1.	The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of the child’s choice.
2.	The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only
be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or
reputations of others; or (b) For the protection of national security or of public order
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.

Id. art. 13.
183. Id. art. 14.

184. See Michael Freeman, Whither Children: Protection, Participation, Autonomy?, 22 Man. L.J. 307, 319

(1994).

185. Respecting the child’s participatory rights “operates both to reduce the indeterminacy of the principle

and to mitigate the potential for judges to substitute their own subjective or speculative preferences as to
what amounts to a child’s best interests.” John Tobin, Judging the Judges: Are They Adopting the Rights
Approach in Matters Involving Children?, 33 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 579, 592 (2009). Where the child is
heard, the family is no longer “a site of exclusive and unfettered parental power.” Id. at 587.
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not prevail. The child’s best interests must be a primary consideration in all actions
concerning children,186 but those interests are not the only consideration. That the
child’s best interests are the basic concern of parents187 does not unduly limit a parent’s
choice in where these best interests lie. Children’s rights frame the conditions of
childhood. Driven by love and a voracious hunger to learn and to be part of things,
children use what is at hand to make their childhoods. In a literal sense, children’s
bodies are their rights. As the body is not separable from the brain and the intellect,
so too are children’s rights in the CRC to be read together.
Horton is beaten for exercising his right to be heard and Jo-Jo refuses to speak for
reasons known only to small frustrated children. Without the rights to speak, participate,
and be informed, children cannot talk about the abuse of their rights. Conversely, abuse
has a destructive impact on children’s ability to speak, participate, and learn. Hitting
children heightens their aggression in the present and their violence in future relationships
of intimacy, lowers their intelligence and school performance,188 and is strongly associated
with depression and substance abuse.189 The same is true when children are verbally and
sexually abused, or denied love altogether.190 All of these actions distort what children
can make of their childhood and limit what they may become as adults.
186. CRC, supra note 3, art. 3(1).
187. Id. art. 18(1).
188. A study on corporal punishment found that

the use of corporal punishment (CP), such as slapping a child’s hand or ‘spanking,’ is
associated with restricted development of cognitive ability. Cognitive ability was measured
at the start of the study and 4 years later for 806 children age 2–4 and 704 children age 5–9
in the National Longitudinal Study of Youth. The analyses controlled for 10 parenting and
demographic variables. Children of mothers in both cohorts who used little or no CP at
Time 1 gained cognitive ability faster than children who were not spanked. The more CP
experienced, the more they fell behind children who were not spanked.

Murray A. Straus & Mallie J. Paschall, Corporal Punishment by Mothers and Development of Children’s
Cognitive Ability: A Longitudinal Study of Two Nationally Representative Age Cohorts, 18:5 J. Aggression,
Maltreatment & Trauma 459, 459 (2009).
189. A large-scale U.S. study found that physical punishment—pushing, grabbing, shoving, slapping,

hitting—below the maltreatment threshold is associated with increased mood and anxiety disorders,
alcohol and drug abuse, dependence, and several personality disorders. The study controlled for
sociodemographic variables and family history of dysfunction.
The American Academy of Pediatrics strongly opposes striking a child for any reason,
and the Canadian Pediatric Society recommends that physicians strongly discourage
the use of physical punishment. A more explicit position statement to be considered in
the future might include the statement that physical punishment (i.e., spanking,
smacking, slapping) should not be used with children of any age. . . . Policies need to be
focused on strategies to reduce physical punishment, which points to the importance of
positive parenting approaches.

Tracie O. Afifi et al., Physical Punishment and Mental Disorders: Results from a Nationally Representative
US Sample, 130 J. Pediatrics 1, 5–8 (2012).
190. The psychological maltreatment of children, also known as emotional abuse, “may be the most challenging

and prevalent form of child abuse and neglect.” Roberta Hibbard et al., Psychological Maltreatment, 130 J.
Pediatrics 372, 372 (2012). Psychological maltreatment may consist of acts of omission including
“ignoring need for social interactions”, or acts of commission including spurning or terrorizing a child.
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Promoting the child’s best interests and protecting the child’s rights have long been
the fiduciary duty of both the state and the parent.191 The first substantive article of the
CRC recognizes this duty.192 References to the parental role are threaded throughout
its provisions, with several substantive articles deferring to parents.193 The rights of
children are entwined with the good of others. The silencing and punishment of girl
children, for example, supports the abuse and denigration of women throughout the
world. “The suggestion is sometimes made that prohibition of corporal punishment
makes the lives of women, as the primary caregivers of children, more difficult.”194 It is
now understood that “all forms of violence are linked to entrenched gender roles and
inequalities” and “‘the violation of the rights of children is closely linked to the status
of women.’”195 The lynchpin of rights for children, as it is for all oppressed and excluded
groups, is the right to be heard. Where children are silenced, their bodies speak.
VI.	“Some small speck of dust that is able to yell”196—concluding
thoughts

Stories for children map the psychic topography of childhood. The mapping of its
complex neurology is just beginning. We know now how deeply blows, humiliation,
and exploitation affect delicate transitions in the development of the brain and body.
The abuse “may be verbal or nonverbal, active or passive, and with or without intent to harm.” Id. The
impact on children is profound. These acts “negatively affect the child’s cognitive, social, emotional, and/
or physical development [and are] linked with disorders of attachment, developmental and educational
problems, socialization problems, disruptive behavior, and later psychopathology.” Id.
The sexual abuse of children causes similar damage. Sexual abuse studies consistently show “posttraumatic symptoms; depression; substance abuse; helplessness, negative attributions, aggressive behaviours
and conduct problems; eating disorders; and anxiety. More recently child sexual abuse has also been linked to
psychotic disorders including schizophrenia and delusional disorder.” Judy Cashmore & Rita Shackel,
Child Family Cmty. Austl., The Long-Term Effects Of Child Sexual Abuse 7–8 (2013) (citations
omitted), available at http://www.aifs.gov.au/cfca/pubs/papers/a143161/cfca11.pdf. Recently conducted
studies of identical twins who were raised apart show that sexual abuse is linked with “a range of psychiatric
disorders” including dependence on drugs, alcohol and nicotine, bulimia nervosa, severe depression, panic
disorder, attempted suicide, conduct disorder, “social anxiety, rape as an adult, and divorce.” Id.
191. See McGillivray, Childhood in the Shadow of Parens Patriae, supra note 74, at 38.
192. CRC, supra note 3, art. 5.

Id.

States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where
applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local
custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in
a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and
guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.

193. See CRC, supra note 3; Cohen, supra note 162, at 196.
194. Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, Prohibiting and

Eliminating Corporal Punishment of Girls—A Key Element in the Global Challenge to
All Violence Against Women and Girls (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.endcorporalpunishment.
org/pages/pdfs/briefings/Corporal%20punishment%20of%20girls.pdf.

195. Id. (quoting Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Independent Expert for the U.N. Study on Violence Against Children).
196. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 2.
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To define rights is to journey deep into the body, into its development, needs, and
multiple relationships with the family, the community, the social, and the natural.
Children’s rights are, profoundly, about their bodies, suggesting that rights for children
are neither utopian nor extraneous but, instead, deeply practical. The confusion of
liberty with rights has done much damage to the recognition of children’s rights.
Visions of permissive parents raising little monsters who rule the roost and wind up in
jail continue to plague the discourse. Seuss’s little monsters—Jo-Jo, Bart, and their
literary kin—are more likely to wind up as responsible citizens in a democratic society
which equally values individuality and communality. Seuss may shoulder less blame
than Dr. Spock197 for the civil rights movement of the 1960s but their views on
childhood resonate strongly.198 Seuss taught children to trust themselves and resist
authoritarian adults.199 “Maybe my book helped a generation not to be intimidated by
adulthood,” Spock wrote.200 “When I was young, I was always made to assume that I
was wrong. Now young people think they might be right and stand up to authority.”201
The Whos offer seemingly endless possibilities for rights metaphors, a “your face
here” for any cause pitting small against big. (But Horton sets a blastocyst on a very
soft clover?202) Horton has been treated as a parable on democracy, 203 civil rights, 204
and the American Occupation of Japan.205 While a rich metaphor works on more
197. Dr. Benjamin Spock is best known for publishing the influential book, Baby and Child Care, in 1946.

For a modern version, see Benjamin Spock & Robert Needlman, Dr. Spock’s Baby and Child
Care (9th ed. 2012).

198. Dr. Spock’s child-rearing advice was widely blamed for the civil rights, anti-war, and nuclear

disarmament movements of the 1960s. See Eric Pace, Benjamin Spock, World’s Pediatrician, Dies at 94,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0502.html.

199. See Jenkins, supra note 10, at 198.
200. Pace, supra note 198.
201. Id.
202. Anti-abortion groups have printed, “A person’s a person no matter how small” on t-shirts, websites, picket

signs, posters, and pamphlets. Seuss once threatened to sue an anti-abortion group for its misappropriation
of the line. In 2001, Seuss’s widow Audrey Geisel “criticized Action Life Ottawa . . . for using the phrase
with a picture of an 8-week old fetus on a pro-life poster” and a lawyer for the Seuss Foundation demanded
that the group not use the line, as “this is not an area in which Dr. Seuss participates.” Elizabeth O’Brien,
New Film: Doctor Seuss’s “Horton Hears a Who” to Raise Pro-Life Questions, LifeSiteNews.com (Aug. 10,
2007, 11:15 AM), http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive//ldn/2007/aug/07081002.

203. Philip Nel remarked:

[Y]ou can read Horton Hears a Who in many ways, but one of the ways of reading Horton
Hears a Who is a parable about democracy—that everyone needs to get involved for
democracy to work. It’s not until all the Whos on this tiny little dust speck speak up
that they are heard and they are saved . . . when every last one does, they are heard.

Dr. Seuss: Icon and Iconoclast... (ABC Radio interview with Philip Nel, Apr. 30, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/booktalk/dr-seuss-icon-and-iconoclast/3627444#transcript);
see also Jenkins, supra note 10.
204. See Nel, supra note 112, at 73.
205. Id. Seuss met Kyoto educator Mitsugi Nakamura, to whom Horton is dedicated, during his 1954 trip to

Japan to study the impact of the American Occupation on children’s upbringing and education. Two
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than one level, none of these interpretations addresses the fact that Jo-Jo is a child
and that hearing the child saves two worlds. The reader identifies with an Indian
elephant living with Australian kangaroos in an African jungle but that is not her
everyday world. Her world is Who-ville, a familiar place of houses with ceilings and
floors, churches and grocery stores, ball games, teapots, potted plants, typewriters,
baby buggies, orchestral instruments, and Yo-Yos, all made delightfully miniature
and visible only to her. It is as if some gargantuan Horton of the mega-planet Nool
saves the tiny planet Earth or, given Who-ville’s sociospecificity, the modern West.
The triumphant shout of the tiny child Jo-Jo confirms her identification with the
Whos, joins her to Horton in his transgression against the Noolian legal order, and
binds her to his message of personhood and rights. It is a message at the constitutional
heart of every human rights instrument and contained within the messenger myths
of cultures throughout the world.
As critical legal pluralism suggests, the law requires a transgressive, inventive,
mediating subject who understands that law is not fixed and certain, sees its travails
and weaknesses, and strives to make good the rights-promises of constitutions and
conventions by challenging their tenets, interpretation, and application. The sour
kangaroo’s child with no thought of her own stands in stark contrast to the Seussian
child, the anti-authoritarian Jo-Jos and Barts who save children from annihilation
and free them from servitude. The Seussian child has gone Where the Wild Things Are
with Maurice Sendak’s Max to tame childhood’s monsters and Outside Over There
with Ida to brave its child-stealing goblins. Epithets—shirker and twerp—frame
Jo-Jo’s transgressions as they frame those of Max the wild thing and poor, mad,
foolish, backwards, sly, and terrible Ida.206 These epithets reflect adult perceptions of
children as incomplete adults, as weak, lacking, and dangerous. 207 The stories
themselves tell an altogether different tale, a tale informed by myth in which the
child protagonist, invested with the knowledge and power of myth, bestows these
powers on the child reader. The mythic element in stories for children does far more
than prepare children as future legal subjects. It forms the stuff from which children
construct their childhoods. It helps children make themselves. For this reason, as
Seuss observes, stories for children “have a greater potential for good, or evil, than
any other form of literature on earth.”208

Seuss titles had been translated into Japanese. Horton was intended to train children “in the relationship
between individual and community” in emerging democracies. See Jenkins, supra note 10, at 188. That
Horton’s ubiquitous looped daisy is replaced on the last page with a pink chrysanthemum may reference
Japan or Chrysanthemum-Pearl, the imaginary daughter to whom the childless Seuss dedicated The 500
Hats of Bartholomew Cubbins (1938). Nel, supra note 112, at 115.
206. McGillivray, State of Imperfect Transformation, supra note 21.
207. See McGillivray, The Long Awaited, supra note 21.
208. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 187.
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